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MISSOURI PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW: AN
ASSESSMENT OF A STATE SUPREME COURT'S
PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL CASES
DONALD H. WALLACE*
JONATHON R. SORENSEN**
In Furman v. Georgia,1 the United States Supreme Court con-
demned capital punishment procedures which did not provide
for meaningful measures to prevent arbitrary sentencing. Subse-
quent to Furman a statutory mechanism to control arbitrariness
has been highlighted by capital punishment jurisdictions. The
intent underlying this procedure is to allow consideration by a
reviewing court of all relevant information regarding the defend-
ant and the crime in determining whether imposition of the
death penalty is in fact appropriate in a particular case when
compared to other cases. In such an appeal the state supreme
court is usually directed to determine whether the sentence was
disproportionate compared to sentences imposed in similar
cases.
This type of review, referred to as "proportionality review,"2
has been adopted as a "check against the random or arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty."' If properly used, proportion-
ality review procedures are viewed as alleviating the evils con-
demned in Furman v. Georgia4 which "create [d] a substantial risk
that punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious
* Professor of Criminal Justice, Central Missouri State University. J.D.
University of Nebraska, LL.M. University of Missouri-Kansas City.
** Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Texas-Pan
American. Sam Houston State University.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). A majority of justices ruled that existing death
penalty statutes violated the Eighth Amendment. Two justices (Brennan and
Marshall) viewed the death penalty as a per se violation of the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and White held that existing statutes violated the eighth amendment
"because of the sentencing patterns they produced." Raymond Paternoster &
Ann Marie Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death Penalty in South Carolina:
Experiences Over the First Few Years, 39 S.C. L. Rv. 245, 249 n.9 (1988).
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976).
3. Id. The majority of justices agreed to uphold the constitutionality of
the death penalty.
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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manner."5 Proportionality appellate review procedures are seen
as allowing a meaningful distinction between those defendants
who received death sentences and those others who did not; as
has been observed,6 one can argue that a death sentence is
unconstitutional under Furman if most other, factually indistin-
guishable defendants receive only lesser sentences for the same
type of crime.
In addition to minimizing the risk of an arbitrary and capri-
cious death sentence, the Court has required that the sentencer
be allowed to give consideration of the individualized circum-
stances of each case, including any mitigating circumstances. 7
Gregg v. Georgia requires that capital sentencing procedures illu-
minate the "personal culpability"' of the offender.9 Conse-
quently, mandatory death penalties have consistently been
invalidated by the Court.10 Thus, while consistent sentencing is
required the sentencing must also be individualized. Yet, despite
the desire to individualize sentences, the goal of maintaining
consistent patterns of sentencing is significant. An examination
of the history of a state appellate court's use of proportionality
review procedures should reveal consistent patterns of
sentencing.
This article will explore the comparative review procedures
used by one state supreme court, the Missouri Supreme Court."1
In part I the concept of proportionality review is discussed. Com-
mentary on procedures used by state courts in proportionality
reviews is explored in part II. An examination of reported Mis-
souri Supreme Court cases in part III is considered to determine
how this court in its reviews creates the pool of eligible cases,
identifies similar cases within this pool, and conducts its method
of comparison of similar cases. Part IV of the article presents an
empirical analysis of the Missouri Supreme Court's assumptions
5. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality
opinion).
6. Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Capital Sentencing in Arizona: A Critical Evaluation,
1984 Amiz. ST. L.J. 1, 8.
7. Id.
8. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 312 (1989); see also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S 586 (1978).
9. See James R. Acker, Dual and Unusual: Competing Views of Death Penalty
Adjudication, 26 CuM. L. BuLL. 123 (1990).
10. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
11. Hereinafter references to "Supreme Court" will indicate Missouri's
supreme court. To alleviate confusion the United States Supreme Court will be
consistently referred to as the U.S. Supreme Court. See Appendix for pertinent
Missouri death penalty statutes.
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regarding the adequacy of its methods used in proportionality
reviews. The conclusion of the analysis presented in this article
suggests that the Missouri Supreme Court has not elected to use
its available resources for a meaningful proportionality review
process.
I. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
A second procedure to ensure against arbitrary and capri-
cious capital sentencing is the use of guided discretion sentenc-
ing.' 2 However, this method has been rendered impotent in
Missouri by decisions of the Missouri and U.S. supreme courts.13
12. The U.S. Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
approved of a separate sentencing hearing where the sentencer is directed to
find a statutorily authorized aggravating factor before it may impose a death
sentence. The Court has observed in California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983),
that excessively vague sentencing standards might lead to the arbitrary and
capricious sentencing patterns condemned in Furman.
Other states have adopted guided discretion procedures similar to those
used in Georgia. Georgia's sentencing scheme does differ somewhat from
Missouri's statute. The Georgia statute provides a listing of the aggravating
factors that are to be considered by the sentencer, but no specific mitigating
factors are provided. In Missouri, the sentencing procedures list both possible
aggravating and mitigating factors for the sentencer to weigh against one
another in recommending a sentence.
In Missouri, the sentencer is required to consider any statutory or non-
statutory aggravating or mitigating factors or circumstances supported by the
evidence as well as all evidence received at trial. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.1
(1986). Although instructions may be given regarding specific statutory
aggravating and mitigating factors and non-statutory aggravating circumstances,
a trial judge is precluded from giving any instructions on nonstatutory
mitigating evidence, Missouri Approved Instructions-Criminal 3d at § 313.44,
Notes on Use 6 (1989) [hereinafter MAI-CR 3d]. If the sentencer finds that
aggravating circumstances are deemed to exist and outweigh mitigating
circumstances, it is not required to assess a penalty of death. Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 565.030.4(4) (1986). If mitigating circumstances are found to exist, the
sentencer is not allowed to impose the death penalty if it finds these mitigating
circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 565.030.4(3) (1986). However, to impose the death penalty there need be no
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances do not
outweigh the aggravating circumstances. See State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417
(Mo. 1983) (en banc); State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
13. To impose a death sentence, the sentencer must find at least one
aggravating factor to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 565.030.4(1) (1986), although the sentencer is not required to impose a
death sentence even if the aggravating factor is found to exist. Missouri follows
the threshold-function interpretation approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983). See State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905, 926
(Mo. 1992) (en banc). In its consideration of the sentence, if an aggravating
factor is found, the sentencer may then consider any non-statutory aggravating
circumstances. The finding of a statutory aggravating factor establishes the
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Consequently the importance of an appropriately functioning
proportionality review process is magnified; whether Missouri's
proportionality review process is functioning appropriately is the
focus of this article.
In an attempt to avoid inappropriate results in capital sen-
tencing and to ensure consistent application of the death pen-
alty, many states use proportionality review by state supreme
courts.1 4 Typically proportionality review statutes direct a state
supreme court to compare death sentences with similar cases
involving similar defendants and similar crimes.15 This type of
review was praised in the plurality opinion of Gregg-
murders in which the death penalty may permissibly be imposed. Here the case
(according to the Georgia Supreme Court) becomes subject to the sentencer's
"discretion, in which all the facts and circumstances of the case determine...
whether.., the death penalty is imposed." Zant v. Stephens, 297 S.E.2d 1, 4
(1982). The U.S. Supreme Court accepted this view of the limited control of
the sentencer's discretion once an aggravating factor is found: "[T ] he finding of
an aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing
body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the
class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty."
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983).
Because of the approval of the threshold function of an aggravating factor
by the United States and Missouri Supreme Courts, the potential for
discriminatory and arbitrary sentencing continues to exist with these provisions
for guided discretion sentencing. The statutory aggravating circumstances may
narrow the murders eligible for the death penalty. Yet, the range of murders
made ineligible is probably narrow, if non-existent. In an examination of the
aggravating factors in light of the 1983 legislative changes to the Missouri
scheme and broad judicial interpretations of the statutory language, it was
concluded that virtually any capital murder could be construed as qualifying a
defendant for the death penalty. Ellen Y. Suni, Recent Developments in Missouri:
The Death Penalty, 54 UMKC L. REv. 553 (1986). Further, by allowing the
consideration of any non-statutory aggravating circumstance once the statutory
aggravating factor is found, any attempt to control the discretion in the actual
imposition of a death sentence has been completely abandoned. See Ursula
Bentele, The Death Penalty in Georgia: Still Arbitrary, 62 WASH U. L.Q. 573, 579
(1985) (making the same observation for Georgia). As Justice Marshall argued
in his dissent in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), the sentencer is given
what was condemned in Furman-the absolute and unfettered discretion in
choosing who dies.
14. As many as 27 states have included a requirement of proportionality
review in their statutes or rules of procedure and at least four other states have
conducted some form of proportionality review in at least some cases without
an express statutory requirement. Richard Van Duizend, Comparative
Proportionality Review in Death Sentence Cases: What? How? Why?, 8 STATE CT. J. 9
(1984).
15. Paternoster & Kazyaka, supra note 1, at 342; Steven M. Sprenger,
Note, A Critical Evaluation of State Supreme Court Proportionality Review in Death
Sentence Cases, 73 IOWA L. REv. 719 (1988).
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[P1roportionality review substantially eliminates the possi-
bility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of
an aberrantjury. If a time comes when juries generally do
not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder
case, the appellate review procedures assure that no
defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a
sentence of death. 16
The U.S. Supreme Court has invalidated a death sentence that
was considered excessive when compared with sentences in simi-
lar cases.17 In Godfrey v. Georgia"8 the Court concluded after
reviewing sentences in other domestic slaying cases that the
defendant's death sentence for a domestic murder was excessive
as it could not be distinguished from the many similar cases
where the death penalty was not imposed.
Since Gregg the Supreme Court has held in Pulley v. Harris9
that proportionality review is not constitutionally required per se.
However, as Godfre ° indicates, a disproportionate sentence can
be found to be unconstitutionally excessive. Further, since the
majority of states with statutory authorization for the death pen-
alty have retained proportionality review, proportionality review
remains of importance.2' The Missouri Supreme Court has
observed that the requirement of proportionality review is "dic-
tated solely by Missouri statutes and is not constitutionally
mandated."22
Commentators have suggested that proportionality review in
practice is not effective in jurisdictions which conduct it. Fre-
quent observations have been made of the cursory comparisof of
cases by appellate courts. 2' For example Bentele 4 has protested
the perfunctory manner in which the Georgia Supreme Court
has performed its proportionality review. A mere listing of cases
deemed to be similar is frequently stated by the Georgia court to
justify affirmance of the death penalty in the case under review.
16. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976).
17. See Paternoster & Kazyaka, supra note 1.
18. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
19. 465 U.S. 37 (1984). The majority held that proportionality review was
unnecessary to ensure fairness since the California death penalty procedures
provided other adequate safeguards.
20. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
21. At least two states repealed their statutory provisions for
proportionality review (Nevada and Oklahoma) and one other made such
review an option for the defendant (NewJersey). Sprenger, supra note 15, at
728.
22. State v. Gilmore, 681 S.W.2d 934, 946 (Mo. 1984).
23. See Sprenger, supra note 15.
24. Benetele, supra note 13.
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The infrequency of reversals is an indication of the ineffective
use of proportionality review. Sprenger 25 reviewed appellate
decisions from several states (Tennessee, Alabama, South Caro-
lina, Ohio, and Mississippi) and found that the courts in these
jurisdictions identified a death sentence as comparatively exces-
sive in only one case. The Missouri Supreme Court has reversed
only one case 26 out of 7027 reported cases on a proportionality
review basis.
Missouri, in authorizing capital punishment,28 has required
a proportionality review to be conducted by the state supreme
court, though there is no constitutional imperative. Missouri
appears to have followed the approved procedures established by
the U.S. Supreme Court. The next section explores the specific
procedures in the applications of proportionality review as
observed by various commentators.
II. THE PROCEDURES FOR PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
An analysis of the steps of proportionality review are
presented in this section of the article. Proportionality review
procedures utilized by numerous jurisdictions have generated
commentary regarding their appropriateness. Specific issues
25. Sprenger, supra note 15.
26. State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
27. See discussion infra note 82 and accompanying text.
28. The current death penalty statute in Missouri was enacted in 1977.
This law is an altered version of a 1975 statute which called for a mandatory
death penalty for those convicted of capital murder, Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.009
(repealed 1978). With the 1976 decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
condemning mandatory death sentencing, the Missouri Supreme Court held in
State v. Duren, 547 S.W.2d 476 (Mo. 1977) (en banc), that the death penalty
provisions of the 1975 law were unconstitutional. The 1977 statute was declared
constitutional by the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason,
594 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. 1980) (en banc). The Court noted that the Missouri
statutes are "virtually identical" to those of Georgia, and with the U.S. Supreme
Court's approval of the Georgia scheme in Gregg, the Missouri court observed
that there could be "no serious question ... as to [the 1977 statutes'] validity
under the federal constitution." Id. at 916. The Missouri Supreme Court
further held the statute to be constitutional under Missouri constitutional
provisions, which are similar to the federal provisions. See Ellen Y. Suni, Recent
Developments in Missouri: Criminal Law: Homicide, 50 UMKC L. REv. 440 (1982).
In 1983 the Missouri legislature substantially modified the 1977 statutory
scheme. Changes were made in the definition of the substantive offense, the
grounds, and the procedures for imposition of the death penalty. In a review of
these modifications Suni observed that, despite the 1983 changes in the
substantive offense, there would be little real impact and that "defendants will
be convicted of the same degree of murder under the new statute as they would
have been under the old." Id. at 554.
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regarding the procedures on creating the pool of cases and
determining comparative excessiveness are examined here.
A. Pool Of Cases
The universe from which similar cases are drawn is not uni-
formly constructed by the state supreme courts.2 9 The State of
Washington uses all cases involving a conviction of a crime, first
degree murder, which is capitally chargeable, whether the
defendant is actually capitally charged or not.30 Some courts
may consider only death sentences.3 " Commentary indicates that
some courts consider both life and death sentence cases whether
or not they advanced to a penalty trial, but only those cases that
had been appealed. 2 A further approach" that some jurisdic-
tions take is to limit the universe of potentially similar cases to
those that resulted in either a life or death sentence, but only if
they advance to a penalty trial.
The method used in a jurisdiction will have important con-
sequences for the proportionality review. Where a pool does not
use all capitally chargeable or even all capitally charged crimes in
the jurisdiction, the sample will be skewed. A pool of cases that
excludes plea-bargained cases and cases in which the defendant
was found guilty of a lesser included offense excludes from the
29. Sprenger, supra note 15, at 721.
30. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130(2)(b) (West 1988). Similarly the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court includes "all cases of murder of the first degree
convictions which were prosecuted or could have been prosecuted under the
[state's death penalty act]." Commonwealth v. Frey, 475 A.2d 700, 707 (Pa.
1984).
31. According to commentators states with such an approach have
included Alabama (Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645 (Ala. 1980)); Illinois (People v.
Free, 447 N.E.2d 218 (Ill. 1983)); Indiana (Judy v. State, 416 N.E.2d 95 (Ind.
1981)); Kentucky (Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1980));
Mississippi (King v. State, 421 So.2d 1009 (Miss. 1982) (en banc)); North
Carolina (State v. Williams, 292 S.E.2d 243 (N.C. 1982)); Ohio (State v. Mapes,
484 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio 1985)); Oklahoma (Parks v. State, 651 P.2d 686 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1982)); South Carolina (State v. Koon, 328 S.E.2d 625 (S.C. 1985));
and Tennessee (State v. Smith, 695 S.W.2d 954 (Tenn. 1985)); see Van Duizend,
supra note 14, and Sprenger, supra note 15, at 730.
32. State v. Harding, 687 P.2d 1247 (Ariz. 1984); McCaskill v. State, 344
So.2d 1276 (Fla. 1977); Ross v. Georgia, 211 S.E.2d 356 (Ga. 1974), cert. denied,
428 U.S. 910 (1976); State v. Flowers, 441 So.2d 707 (La. 1983); State v. Reeves,
344 N.W.2d 433 (Neb. 1984); State v. Garcia, 664 P.2d 969, 978 (N.M. 1983); see
Sprenger, supra note 15, at 737.
33. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1027 (Del. 1985); Bowers v. State, 507
A.2d 1072, 1092-94 (Md. 1986); see Sprenger, supa note 15, at 734.
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analysis those cases involving the leniency of juries and
prosecutors. 4
B. Determining Comparative Excessiveness
The second major task in the comparative review process is
the method for determining comparative excessiveness. Beyond
defining the general pool of cases eligible for comparison, the
selection of the specific cases for the comparative review and
determining the appropriate method of comparison present
unique questions.
1. Selection Of Cases For Comparison
In the selection of the specific pool of cases to be used for
the comparative review, Goodpaster35 would call for a careful
selection of characteristics which establish the class of similar
cases. This entails the necessity of finding the precise bases for
the sentence chosen. A reviewing court will need to know which
sentencing factors were found by the sentencer and their relative
importance. Yet, an observation of the certified aggravating fac-
tor in a case may not illuminate the actual reason for the sen-
tence. Since the finding of an aggravating circumstance merely
permits the sentencing of death, as Goodpaster 36 noted the spe-
cific reason for the death sentence may have arisen from the
numerous other circumstances a sentencer is permitted to con-
sider under the threshold-function interpretation approved by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Zant v. Stephens.37 With a detailed
trial report a reviewing court should be able to discern the rea-
son for a sentence in order for the case to be used for the com-
parative review process.
2. Appropriate Method of Comparison
Once the underlying basis for a sentence has been deter-
mined the appropriate method for the comparison of cases must
be established. Several different methods can be used by appel-
late courts in the proportionality review.3 8 Baldus, Pulaski, and
34. State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 20-21 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (SeilerJ.,
dissenting); Gary Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death Sentences, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 786 (1983).
35. Gary Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death Sentences, 74 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 786 (1983).
36. Id.
37. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); see supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
38. Paternoster & Kazyaka, supra note 1, at 339.
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Woodworth 9 identified three methods. Under the "reasonable-
ness" approach no comparison or even reference to other cases
is made. Instead an assessment of the egregiousness of the case
is made and the court subjectively determines whether a death
sentence is a reasonable penalty.4 ° Under the "precedent-seek-
ing" approach the reviewing court will identify specific aggravat-
ing features about the offense which justify a death sentence. In
affirming a death sentence the court will select previously
affirmed death sentences which it will cite as comparable based
on the identified aggravating features.
The "frequency approach" entails a true comparative review
of similar cases.41 Under this approach the reviewing court
should determine the elements which lead to a death sentence in
the case and identify the comparison cases using the identified
relevant factors. With this data the reviewing court estimates the
number of death sentences which have been imposed in this
identified pool of cases. A determination is made as to whether
the death penalty is being imposed sufficiently often to justify
affirming the sentence under review.42
A genuine comparative review, which the frequency
approach offers, would appear necessary4" to alleviate the con-
cerns of comparative excessiveness identified in the plurality
opinion in Gregg v. Georgia. Despite the lack of a constitutional
requirement' for proportionality review, statutory requirements
of appellate review calling for comparison of a death sentence
with similar cases would appear to dictate the use of a "fre-
quency" approach. As Goodpaster45 suggested, a comparison to
other cases provides an external check to comparative excessive-
ness that other forms of comparison, such as offense proportion-
ality comparison" or intra-case proportionality comparison, 47
cannot accomplish.
39. David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CuM. L. & CIUMINOLoGY 661, 669
(1983).
40. Paternoster & Kazyaka, supra note 1, at 339; see South Carolina v.
Hyman, 281 S.E.2d 209 (S.C. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982).
41. Paternoster & Kazyaka, supra note 1, at 341.
42. Baldus et al., supra note 39.
43. Paternoster & Kazyaka, supra note 1, at 342.
44. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
45. Goodpaster, supra note 34.
46. An example of offense proportionality comparison would be the
imposition of the death penalty for non-homicidal offenses.
47. An example of intra-case proportionality comparison is where
multiple defendants are disparately sentenced though they were charged with
same crimes on the same evidence.
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III. MISSOURI'S PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROCEDURES
This section of the article will present both an analysis of the
steps of proportionality review as applied in Missouri and an
empirical analysis of the Supreme Court's proportionality
reviews. Missouri's requirement for its independent, proportion-
ality review is similar to Georgia's formulation.4" The Missouri
statutory requirement is to determine whether:
the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both [sic]
the crime, the strength of the evidence and the
defendant.49
In Wilkins v. State5" the Missouri Supreme Court noted the 1984
statutory amendments which added the "strength of the evi-
dence" language. This allowed the court to distinguish life sen-
tenced cases which involved heinous murders where evidence
was circumstantial and the precise role of the accused in the kill-
ing was unclear.
The Missouri statute omits various specifics regarding the
process of proportionality review. Not addressed by the statute is
the determination of which murder cases and what method of
comparison should be considered in the review.5" Thus, the
issues for examination in this research involve the creation of the
pool of cases which are eligible for comparison, the identifica-
tion of similar cases from this pool, and the appropriateness of
the method of comparison.
A. Missouri's Procedures
1. Pool Of Cases
Although no explicit guidance is provided by the Missouri
proportionality review statute, implicit directions in the selection
of the pool of cases for the proportionality review are made in
the Missouri statute requiring the compilation of trial reports on
capital murder convictions. For purposes of determining the
"validity of the sentence," Missouri state statute requires that the
Supreme Court "accumulate the records of all cases in which the
sentence of death or life imprisonment without probation or
parole was imposed after May 26, 1977, or such earlier date as
48. The South Carolina statute is also similar to Georgia's. See
Paternoster & Kazyaka, supra note 1.
49. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.035.03 (1986).
50. State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
51. Suni, supra note 28, at 465.
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the court may deem appropriate."5" This statute ensures that the
Supreme Court has data from both death and life sentenced cap-
ital cases. As of 1992 the Court has data on 366 cases resulting in
capital murder convictions. The Court has collected data on 200
capital murder cases where the case proceeded to penalty trial.
One hundred (100) resulted in a death penalty.5 3
Without this statutory requirement the Supreme Court
would have only trial transcripts of the appealed death sentence
cases, and would not have trial transcripts for many of the
appealed life sentence cases. Life sentenced cases are subject to
appeal first to the intermediate level of appellate courts. The
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends to all cases
except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.54 The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction in all
cases where the punishment imposed is death.55 Arguably the
broad requirement of record collection for the Supreme Court's
review requires that all capital cases where sentence was imposed
either by plea agreement or through a penalty trial, appealed or
not, be considered for identifying the pool of similar cases. The
pool would be limited to first degree murder 6 convictions since
this is the only crime for which sentences of death or life without
parole are possible.
Despite this implicit guidance, the Missouri Supreme Court
has limited the universe of potentially similar cases to those that
resulted in either a life or death sentence, 57 but only if they
advanced to a penalty trial58 and have been appealed.59 Conse-
quently, cases where the death penalty was waived are not consid-
ered. The pool is further limited by the court's exclusion of
cases where the jury could not reach a recommendation on a
52. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.035.6 (Supp. 1986).
53. See Jonathon R. Sorensen & Donald H. Wallace, An Assessment of
Missouri's Comparative Review in Capital Cases Using the Barnett Scale, Paper
Presented at the Academy of CriminalJustice Sciences Annual Meeting, Kansas
City, MO (1993).
54. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 3.
55. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 3; Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 565.035.1, 565.035.7
(1986).
56. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.020.2 (Supp. 1990).
57. In Missouri the defendant is entitled to be sentenced by jury, though
the sentencer may be a jury or a judge. A defendant can waive sentencing by a
jury and choose to be sentenced by the judge; or if ajury is unable to agree on
the sentence, the judge may declare the punishment as death or life
imprisonment. Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.030.4 (1986); see State v. Griffin, 756
S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
58. State v. Sloan, 756 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
59. State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487, 495 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
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sentence and the judge exclusively decided the sentence."
Thus, only those cases are included in the pool where a jury was
confronted with the choice between death and life imprisonment
and exercised that choice.61
The limitations on pool inclusion of cases removes cases
involving the leniency of juries and prosecutors.62 The smaller
pool will result in a greater proportion of those defendants even-
tually sentenced to death than if the pool had not been so
reduced by the limitations imposed by the Missouri Supreme
Court.63 Thus, the probability is created of a greater likelihood
of a finding of proportionateness.
The Court has collected data on 173 capital murder cases
where punishment was decided by a jury. Ninety-three (93)
resulted in a death penalty and in 80 cases the jury chose a life
sentence. 64
2. Selection Of Cases For Comparison
The Missouri Supreme Court has ample information regard-
ing the underlying circumstances that provided the basis of the
sentence in a reported case. The trial judge reports required to
be collected by the Missouri Supreme Court contain information
on all aggravating and mitigating factors submitted to the jury
and those aggravating factors that were certified by the jury. Evi-
dence of non-statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances
is also listed in these reports. Data concerning the defendant,
the trial, the offense, and representation of the defendant are
provided in these reports. The trial judge is given the opportu-
nity to comment on the appropriateness of the sentence imposed
in the case. Despite the abundance of information available to
the Court, according to one observer,65 the Missouri Supreme
Court tends to select its cases for its comparison largely on the
singular basis of a common aggravating factor certified by the
jury. By confining its attention solely to the aggravating factors
the court excludes the examination of many nonstatutory cir-
cumstances which a jury is permitted to consider after the find-
ing of an aggravating factor (where a defendant is sentenced to
death).
60. State v. Byrd, 676 S.W.2d 494, 507 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
61. State v. Zeitvogel, 707 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
62. See supra text accompanying note 34.
63. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
64. See Sorensen & Wallace, supra note 53.
65. Ellen Y. Suni, Capital Punishment in Missouri: Recent Developments in the
Interpretation and Administration of the Death Penalty, 58 UMKC L. Rv. 523, 566
(1990).
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3. Methods of Comparison
Case law in Missouri does not suggest a clear characteriza-
tion of the methodology used by the Supreme Court in its
reviews. According to Suni66 a strict precedent-seeking approach
at times is used where the court looks to see whether a prior case
exists in which ajury imposed a death sentence in similar circum-
stances. Thus, an examination of Missouri cases can reveal which
of the "reasonableness," "precedent-seeking," or "frequency"
approaches is used predominantly by the Court in its review.
B. Examination Of Missouri's Procedures
The cases under consideration in this article are cases where
a death penalty was appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court
during the years 1981 through 1991. The following table summa-
rizes the number of cases cited in the court's review of a sentence
and whether the cited cases were life or death sentenced. It also
details the number of citations made of a case in later reviews.
The court's finding of the basis of the sentence for selection of
the cases for the comparison and the type of review are also
presented.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF ANALYSES OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT'S
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW METHODS
Year of Method of # of cases cited # of later
appeal Method of selection of in review reviews citing
Defendant decision comparison comparable cases Total Life Death this case
Amrine 1987 P AGG 3 0 3 3
Antwine 1987 P AGG 9 0 9 3
Baker, R. 1982 P AGG 2 2 0 1
Bannister 1984 R NOBAS 4 0 4 3
Battle 1983 R CAT 0 0 0 16
Blair 1982 R CAT/NOBAS 1 0 1 16
Bolder 1982 R CAT 0 0 0 13
Boliek 1986 P AGG 3 0 3 2
Byrd 1984 P AGG 4 0 4 7
Chambers 1986 p AGG 4 0 4 0
Cleemons 1988 P AGG 7 0 7 2
Davis 1991 P AGG 11 0 11 0
Driscoll 1986 P AGG 6 0 6 6
Feltrop 1991 R NOBAS 4 0 4 0
Foster 1985 P AGG 4 0 4 7
Gilmore 1985 R NOBAS 4 0 4 1
Gilmore 1983 P AGG 4 0 4 12
Gilmore 1984 P AGG 1 0 1 5
Griffin, L 1983 R CAT 0 0 0 1
Griffin, M 1988 P AGG 5 0 5 2
Grubbs 1987 R NOBAS 4 0 4 5
Guinan-I 1985 P&P+ AGG 2 0 2 9
Guinan-lI 1987 P AGG 9 0 9 4
Johns 1984 P&P+ AGG 5 1 4 9
Jones, M 1986 R NOBAS 3 0 3 3
Jones, W 1988 P AGG 11 3 8 2
66. Suni, supra note 28.
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
Year of Method of # of cases cited # of later
appeal Method of selection of in review reviews citing
Defendant decision comparison comparable cases Total Life Death this case
Kenley 1985 P AGG
Kilgore 1989 P AGG
Larette 1983 R NOBA
Lashley 1984 P AGG
Laws 1983 P AGG
Leisure, D 1988 P&P+ AGG
Lingar 1987 P AGG
Mallett 1987 P&P+ AGG
Malone 1985 R NORA
Mathenia 1986 P AGG
McDonald 1983 R CAT/NO
Mcllvoy 1982 R&P+ CAT/CO-
McMillin 1990 P AGG
Mercer 1981 R CAT
Murray 1988 P AGG
Nave 1985 P AGG
Newlon 1982 R CAT
Oneal 1986 P AGG
Oxford 1990 P AGG
Parkus 1988 P&P+ AGG
Pollard 1987 P AGG
Powell 1990 P AGG
Preston 1984 P+ AGG
Reese 1990 P AGG
Roberts 1986 P AGG
Rodden 1987 P AGG
Sandles 1987 P AGG
Schlup 1987 P AGG
Schneider 1987 R NOBA
Shaw 1982 R&P+ CAT/A
Sidebottom 1988 P AGG
Six 1991 P AGG
Sloan 1988 P&P+ AGG
Smith, S 1989 P AGG
Smith-I 1983 R CAT
Smith-lI 1988 P AGG
Stokes 1982 R CAT/NO
Sweet 1990 P AGG
Trimble 1982 R CAT/NO
Walls 1988 P AGG
Wilkins 1987 P&P+ AGG
Williams 1983 P AGG
Young 1985 P+ AGG
Zeitvogel 1986 P&P+ AGG
Mean
Key. Method of comparison:
R. reasonableness approach
P: precedent-seeking approach
P+: detailed precedent-seeking approach
iS
BAS
DEF
GG
)BAS
)BAS
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
7
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
00
0
2
0
3
4
0.5
4
101
3
2
10
11
5
3
7
1
0
8
0
5
5
0
7
10
10
5
8
8
4
9
12
4
8
4
1
10
4
13
10
0
13
2
4
2
11
7
1
3
7
5.1
2
3
11
118
1
2
2
3
4
15
71
7
4
1
17
6
0
1
7
1
5
0
10
4
0
6
0
12
1
0
0
0
9
2
11
0
9
4
5
2
4
9
4.8
Method of selection of cases:
CAT: catalog of cases
NOBAS: identified cases without basis
AGG: aggravating factor
CO-DEF: Co-defendant's case
1. Selection Of Cases For Comparison
a. "Cataloging" Prior Cases
In several of the earlier cases the court deemed its task in
selecting cases for comparison as one of referencing all prior
capital cases. For example in State v. Battle the Court stated that
it had "reviewed the capital cases in which death and life impris-
onment have been submitted to the jury . .. in which the jury
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agreed on punishment and which have been ruled on appeal."67
In a footnote the court listed all of these cases and concluded
that the defendant's death sentence "is not excessive or dispro-
portionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases." 68 In other
instances the Court notes only that it has reviewed the prior
cases, but does not even list them by name. In State v. Griffin6 9
the court after making this type of statement simply concluded
that these cases "do not point to excessiveness or disproportion-
ality in the sentence in this case."7 °
In these cases where the Court has explicitly or implicitly
cataloged all prior cases in the review, no basis is provided by the
Court to determine which cases it deemed were similar. The
Court in these cases is not relating its methodology of how it
establishes the class of similar cases, or whether it even has a
methodology. As the concurring opinion in State v. Smith71
observed: "All an observer learns from this is that to the values of
the court there is nothing wrong with the death sentence
here."7 2
In these instances where the Court has made an explicit or
implicit catalog of all prior cases eligible for consideration in the
review these are identified by "CAT" in Table 1 in the column on
Selection of Comparable Cases. Twelve reviews used this method
of selection of comparable cases. Six of these used this method
67. State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487, 495 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
68. Id. at 495 n.8 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). See also State v. Blair, 638 S.W.2d
739, 759 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1188 (1983); State v.
Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137
(1983); State v. Mclivoy, 629 S.W.2d 333, 341 (Mo. 1982) (en banc); State v.
Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1931);
State v. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606, 623 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
884 (1982); State v. Shaw, 636 S.W.2d 667, 676 (Mo. 1982) (the Court noted all
prior cases, but explicitly identified several as similar) (en banc), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 928 (1982); State v. Trimble, 638 S.W.2d 726, 738 (Mo. 1982) (the
Court noted all prior cases, but explicitly identified two as similar) (en banc),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1188 (1983); State v. Stokes, 638 S.W.2d at 715 (Mo. 1982)
(the Court stated that it had "surveyed, again" the cases indicated in Shaw
without indicating whether it was referring to the catalog of cases made in Shaw
or just those specifically identified as being similar) (en banc), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1017 (1983).
69. State v. Griffin, 662 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
70. State v. Griffin, 662 S.W.2d 854, 860 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). In State v.
Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), the Court stated that it had
"reviewed the records of the twenty-two capital cases in which death and life
imprisonment have been submitted to the jury" and noted that "sentence of
death is not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases" without
indicating the names of any of these cases. Id. at 434-35.
71. State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
72. Id. at 435 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (Seiler, J., concurring).
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exclusively. In Table 1 the number of cases identified as being
similar reflects this cataloging technique. Where the Court
merely catalogs prior decided cases, Table 1 lists the Number Of
Cases Cited In Review as zero, "0." If other cases are specifically
identified by the Court as similar these will be counted in Table
1.
This cataloging method of selecting the cases for review
from the eligible pool of cases will dictate the method of compar-
ison used by the court. Where an explicit or an implicit catalog
of all cases is made this would likely fit within the definition of
the "reasonableness" approach identified by Baldus, Pulaski, and
Woodworth.7 This is indicated in Table 1 by an "R" in the col-
umn describing the Method of Comparison. Where an addi-
tional letter appears in this column this indicates the Method of
Comparison for specifically identified cases that were included
with the cataloged list of cases.
b. Cases Identified Without Basis
The Court has selected cases for comparison without indicat-
ing the basis of similarity. Usually the court will note that these
identified cases "comport with affirmance of the death penalty in
this case."74 This method of selection of comparative cases will be
indicated in Table 1 in the column on the Selection of Compara-
ble Cases with a "NOBAS." Ten cases were identified which used
this method of selecting comparable cases; eight of these used
this method exclusively.
It will be assumed that the court utilized the "reasonable-
ness" approach identified by Baldus, Pulaski, and Woodworth.75
This is identified in Table 1 by an "R" in the column describing
the Method of Comparison.
c. Aggravating Factor
The majority of the Missouri Supreme Court reviews relied
upon a certified aggravating factor to find similar cases for the
comparison. Frequently the bare aggravating factor itself is the
only means used to identify similar cases. For example in State v.
Amrine76 it was found that the defendant as an inmate committed
capital murder of a fellow inmate. The Court indicated that in
"reviewing prior cases involving death sentences imposed for
murders committed within correctional institutions, we have
73. Baldus et al., supra note 39, at 668.
.74. State v. Bannister, 680 S.W.2d 141, 149 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
75. Baldus et al., supra note 39, at 668.
76. State v. Amrine, 741 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
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found the sentence to be neither disproportionate or exces-
sive." '77 The Court then identified three cases where a prison kill-
ing was identified as the aggravating factor.
This method of selecting similar cases is indicated in Table 1
with "AGG" in the column dealing with the Selection of Compa-
rable Cases. Fifty-one cases were identified using this method of
selecting cases, fifty of these used this method exclusively. This
limited means of identifying similar cases usually leads to a prece-
dent-seeking approach for the Method of Comparison and this is
indicated on Table 1 with a "P" in this column.
A more detailed precedent-seeking approach has been uti-
lized.7" This approach involves more than the bare precedent-
seeking approach identified by Baldus et al.79 A comparison of
the factors of the crime, evidence, and the defendant with other
cases is made. This detailed precedent-seeking approach differs
from the frequency approach identified by Baldus et al.8 ° because
it does not involve an estimation of the number of death
sentences imposed in the identified pool. An example of this
approach is State v. Mallett.sl Here the Court distinguished the
similar life sentenced cases by assessing the various factors involv-
ing the crime and the defendant. This approach is frequently
found where life sentenced cases are involved in the review. This
more detailed precedent-seeking approach is indicated on Table
1 with a "P+" in the column defining the Method of Comparison.
d. Co-Defendant's Case
In only one case has the Missouri Supreme Court deter-
mined that a death sentence was disproportionate. In State v.
McIlvoy s2 the court made reference to the names of all capital
cases eligible for proportionality review. However, the court
appears to have made its decision on the basis of the co-defend-
ant's life sentence and of the defendant being "but a weakling
[mentally and educationally deficient] and follower in executing
the murder scheme perpetrated by [the co-defendant.]"" Thus,
in the one case reversed because of disproportionality, the
Court's task was simplified by the comparison to the co-defend-
77. Id. at 676.
78. Suni, supra note 28.
79. Baldus et al., supra note 39, at 668.
80. Id.
81. State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
82. State v. Mcllvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
83. Id. at 341.
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ant.84 This intra-case proportionality comparison does not pro-
vide much assistance to defendants who acted without a co-
defendant in their crimes, nor much guidance to the Missouri
Supreme Court in reviews involving these latter defendants. This
method of selection of the case is noted as "CO-DEF" in Table 1.
2. Methods of Comparison
In twenty cases the Court used a reasonableness approach in
its review. In two of these, this was combined with a detailed pre-
cedent-seeking approach. In 48 cases the Court used a strict pre-
cedent-seeking approach. This was combined with a more
detailed precedent-seeking approach in eight of the 48 cases
identified. In twelve cases the Court used a detailed precedent-
seeking approach. This approach was combined with other
approaches in ten of these twelve cases.
In none of these cases did the Court use the frequency
approach. Some cases implemented a review involving a number
of cases. The review using the most prior cases in its review was
State v. Preston with85 15. Seventeen cases used ten or more cases
in its review. All of these cases identified a common aggravating
factor as the method of selecting comparable cases. All of these
cases using ten or more decisions in their review used the prece-
dent-seeking method of review; six included a detailed prece-
dent-seeking approach. Forty-one cases used 5 or fewer cases in
their reviews. Six referred to no individual case. The average
number of cases cited in the reviews was 5.6 (5.1 death- and 0.5
life-sentenced cases).
Twenty-two reviews used a common aggravating factor as a
method of selecting similar cases. Twenty-three used a prece-
dent-seeking approach, some combined with another approach,
in their reviews. Twenty used a reasonableness approach in their
reviews, some combined with another.
The case most frequently cited in later cases is State v.
Newlon.86 This case has been cited 17 times. Eleven cases have
been cited 10 or more times; 29 (less than half the cases
reviewed) have been cited 5 or more times in later cases.
84. Were the Missouri Supreme Court faced with the Mclvoy review
today, it is questionable whether the court would decide the case the same way,
observed Judge Billings, concurring in State v. Bibb, 702 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Mo.
1985) (en banc). See Suni, supra note 28.
85. State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
86. State v. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
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3. Life Sentenced Cases In Reviews
A second table is presented which examines the 32 life sen-
tence cases the Missouri Supreme Court referred to either specif-
ically or explicitly cataloged in its proportionality reviews. This
table details the number of times the case was cited and those
cases which cited it.
The table indicates that 34 life sentenced cases have been
used by the Missouri Supreme Court in 18 cases. Only 24 life
cases (identified by **) were more than merely catalogued in 13
proportionality reviews (identified by *). This should be com-
pared to the Court's access to the trial court reports of 80 jury
life-sentenced and appealed cases. This represents a small por-
tion of the available cases being utilized for the proportionality
review.
Thus, a total of 13 death sentence reviews identified individ-
ual life cases. These reviews involved more than mere cataloging
of all prior decided cases. All of these reviews were decided
before 1989, the most recent were decided in 1988 (State v.
Jones8 7 and State v. Sloan8 8 ). Ten reviews have been decided since
Sloan and none of these referred to any life cases, either being
individually identified or even merely cataloged.
C. Summary of Comparative Review
In summary, this analysis of the Missouri Supreme Court's
procedures shows that the pool of eligible cases for the propor-
tionality review is severely constricted. Yet, even the pool is not
used to its full extent. Rarely does the Court even refer to a life
sentence case; frequently, if a life sentence case is cited it is
referred to only by name without articulating a "standard by
which ... [these life cases] support the affirmance of the death
penalty."8 9
The Court uses a variety of methods of selecting cases for
comparison. The methods include: cataloging all prior deci-
sions, citing identified cases without indicating the basis of simi-
larity, and relying upon a common aggravating factor. Of these
methods the last is preferable, but even this falls far short of an
adequate method of selecting similar cases for the review. Even
though this aggravating factor may have been certified by the
jury, the threshold-approach to the sentencer's use of aggravat-
ing factors approved by the Missouri Supreme Court undercuts
87. State v.Jones, 749 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
88. State v. Sloan, 756 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
89. State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1, 21 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (Seiler, J.,
dissenting).
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TABLE 2. LIFE SENTENCED CASES USED IN MISSOURI SUPREME
COURT PROPORTIONALITY REVIEWS
Defendant in Year of life
life sentenced sentenced # of
case case affirmed Cases that reviewed this case times cited
Allen**
Bashe**
Baskerville**
Betts**
Borden
Bostic**
Carr**
Coleman
Davis**
Downs**
Emerson
Engleman
Greathouse
Hurt**
Jensen
Laws**
Lomax**
Martin
Mitchell**
Royal**
Salkil
Sargent**
Scott
Stephens**
Stewart**
Tate**
Thomas**
Turner**
White**
Williams, E
Williams, V**
Wirth**
Woods**
Zeitvogel**
Mean
Key:
*:Case used in review which more than merely catalogued case
*Review which more than merely catalogued case
this method as a basis for finding similar cases. A variety of cir-
cumstances may have led the jury to decide upon the death pen-
alty, once it has found that the defendant was eligible for the
1986 Jones*
1983 Preston*
1981 Battle, Blair, Bolder, McIlvoy, Sloan*
1983 Pollard*
1982 Battle, Blair, Bolder, McIlvoy, Mercer,
Newlon
1981 Battle, Blair, Bolder, McIlvoy, Preston*
1986 Mallett*, Zeitvogel*
1983 Battle
1983 Baker*, Battle, Johns*, Mallett*, Shaw*
1980 Battle, Bolder, McIlvoy, Mercer, Newlon,
Young*
1981 Battle, Blair, Bolder, Mcllvoy
1982 Blair, Battle
1982 Blair, Battle, Bolder, Mcllvoy
1984 Zeitvogel*
1981 Battle, Blair, Bolder, Mcllvoy
1983 Preston*
1986 Mallett*
1983 Battle
1981 Battle, Blair, Bolder, Mcllvoy, Mercer,
Newlon, Preston*, Wilkins*, Young*
1981 Battle, Blair, Bolder, Mcllvoy, Mercer,
Newlon, Preston*
1983 Battle
1985 Mallett*
1983 Battle
1984 Mallett*
1986 Zeitvogel*
1987 Mallett*, Jones*
1981 Baker*, Battle, Blair, Bolder. Mallett,
Mcllvoy, Shaw*
1981 Battle, Blair, Bolder, Mcllvoy, Newlon,
Preston*, Wilkins*, Young*
1981 Roberts*
1983 Battle
1981 Battle, Blair, Bolder, Mcllvoy*, Mercer,
Newlon
1986 Jones*
1983 Preston*
1983 Zeitvogel*
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death penalty by certifying the aggravating factor. The Missouri
Supreme Court has this information available, as it has available
the statutorily required trial judge reports. Yet, no Supreme
Court review is found to have expressly relied upon the trial
judge report in selecting similar cases for comparison.
A variety of methods are used in the actual comparison of
cases. Two methods articulated by Baldus et al.,9" the reasonable-
ness and precedent-seeking, are used in addition to a detailed
precedent-seeking approach identified by Suni.91 The detailed
precedent-seeking approach is preferable. However, this is not a
true comparative review, which would utilize a frequency
approach. Too often with the precedent-seeking approach the
Court will merely seek a prior case, usually based upon a similar
aggravating factor, to justify the result.92
The simplicity of the frequency approach avoids the compli-
cations of the precedent-seeking method of comparison. It
would require the Court to determine the frequency of life
sentences within a group of identified similar cases. By determin-
ing the frequency the Court can determine whether a life sen-
tence reflected merely a rare, isolated grant of mercy from ajury,
or whether the number of life sentences suggest that the death
sentence being reviewed is disproportionate. In no case did the
Missouri Supreme Court use the frequency approach; instead it
relies upon explanations such as that from State v. Mallett93
The issue when determining the proportionality of a death
sentence is not whether any similar case can be found in
which the jury imposed a life sentence, but rather whether
the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate in light
of 'similar cases' as a whole.94
While the first part of this statement cannot be argued with, the
second part seems to suggest the need to use a frequency
approach to make the comparison of "similar cases as a whole."
But, the Court has yet to follow its own explanation of propor-
tionality review.
IV. THE PRECEDENT-SEEKING BASIS
The argument may be raised that the Missouri Supreme
Court's methodology, despite not being a true proportionality
review, still adequately identifies similar cases for its mandated
90. Baldus et al., supra note 39.
91. Suni, supra note 28.
92. Suni, supra note 28.
93. State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
94. Id. at 542 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
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review and is able to distinguish clearly proportionate and exces-
sive cases. For if the discretion of the sentencer is controlled by a
guided discretion sentencing scheme, it may be hypothesized
that over an aggregate of cases consistent patterns in the use of
statutorily authorized factors should appear. The Missouri
Supreme Court in its precedent seeking style of proportionality
review assumes this situation in its categorization of cases which
are deemed not to be disproportionate because of the use of cer-
tain aggravating factors (e.g. torture or depravity of mind, multi-
ple murders, prison killings and robbery killings). As indicated
in the prior section the Missouri Supreme Court selects its cases
for its comparison largely on the basis of a particular certified
aggravating factor. For example, the Court in several cases has
held that murders where the aggravating factor (involving tor-
ture or depravity of mind and thus outrageous, wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman) is found, have consistently resulted in the
death penalty.95 The Court has cited the aggravating factor of
being a multiple murderer as meriting justification of the death
sentence.96 Where the murderer killed while in a place of lawful
confinement, the Court has observed that it has consistently
found death sentences not to be disproportionate. 97 For indis-
criminant murders occurring during the course of a robbery, the
Court has stated it has repeatedly affirmed death sentences in
such cases as not being disproportionate.98 From these categori-
zations it can be concluded that where common aggravating fac-
tors are identified in prior cases and in the case under review the
Court will not find the death sentence to be disproportionate.99
The Missouri Supreme Court uses the same method of seek-
ing a precedent among similar death sentences when the Court
turns its attention to the importance of the presence of a mitigat-
ing factor. The Court's proportionality review appears to be a
matter of demonstrating that the presence of certain mitigating
factors has not precluded the death penalty in prior cases.'0 0 The
Court has observed that death sentences have been affirmed
where defendants have alleged their participation in the crime
95. See State v. Leisure, 749 S.W.2d 366 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (citing
cases); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
96. See State v. Rodden, 728 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (citing
cases).
97. See State v. Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); State v.
Schlup, 724 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
98. See State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); State v.
Murray, 744 S.W.2d 762 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); State v. Pollard, 735 S.W.2d 345
(Mo. 1987) (en banc).
99. Suni, supra note 65.
100. Id.
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was minor.1"1 The Court has on several occasions pointed out
that despite a petitioner's allegation of young age, defendants of
young ages have had death sentences affirmed. 102 Where
defendants have lacked a history of assaultive convictions, the
Court has noted that death sentences have still been affirmed.1
0 3
The Court has observed that death sentences have been upheld
in cases where evidence was presented to show the defendant's
diminished capacity.10 4
A. Testing the Precedent-Seeking Basis
This part of the article presents an empirical analysis of the
Missouri Supreme Court's assumptions regarding the adequacy
of the methods used in its proportionality reviews. Missouri case
law raises empirical questions regarding the adequacy of its pre-
cedent-seeking method of proportionality review and its identifi-
cation of categories of nondisproportionate death sentences.
The analysis in this part of the article examines the sentences in
Missouri where they have advanced to a penalty trial and resulted
in either a life or death sentence by ajury and seeks to delineate
important sentencing factors that consistently relate to the
sentences. A frequency analysis is presented here of the Missouri
Supreme Court's assumption that particular aggravating factors
consistently result in the death penalty.
B. Results Of Analysis Of Court's Assumptions
Using data collected by the Missouri Supreme Court the
Court's assumptions regarding its proportionality review can be
tested. The data come from trial judge reports collected by the
Supreme Court. As of November 1992, a total of 366 capital
murder convictions were contained in these reports, 173 of
which met the Supreme Court's criteria to be selected for pro-
portionality review. These 173 cases were sentenced by a jury
and resulted in either a life or death sentence and have been
appealed. Excluded are all sentences which resulted from plea
bargains, bench trials, and also those cases in which jurors were
unable to reach a decision. 10 5
101. State v. Walls, 744 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (citing cases).
102. State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (age 16);
State v. Pollard, 735 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); State v. Lashley, 667
S.W.2d 712 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (age 17).
103. State v. Walls, 744 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (citing cases).
104. State v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (citing cases).
105. See discussion supra note 58 and accompanying text. While it may be
more appropriate to consider all death-eligible cases among those arrested or
all cases resulting in capital murder convictions, only examined here are the
19K4
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With these data, a rudimentary frequency analysis can be
constructed based on the factors most commonly identified by
the Court in its selection of similar cases for proportionality
review - aggravating circumstances. 10 6 In addition, since the
Court also typically mentions the lack of importance of mitigat-
ing factors present in the case, these frequencies are also
presented. The statutory language of these variables is located in
the appendix to this article.10 7 Finally, a table is constructed in
order to determine if death sentencing rates are contingent
upon the raw numbers of aggravating or mitigating factors, or a
combination of the two. This approach is based on the statutory
imperative that jurors weigh mitigating against aggravating evi-
dence in the punishment decision and the aggregation of the
raw numbers of factors allows for some comparison on this basis
of net level of aggravation.
1. Death Sentencing Frequencies-Aggravating Factors
When the court's citations to life-sentenced cases in Table 2
are compared to Table 3 a much larger pool of available cases is
seen to exist than is utilized by the Court. While the Court inevi-
tably cites a list of cases resulting in death sentences with aggra-
vating factors similar to those in the case under review, only 93 of
173 or 54% of cases decided by juries resulted in death
sentences.
What Table 3 reveals is that the death-sentencing rates for
cases grouped by aggravating circumstances are about 50%.
Using the Baldus et al' 8 standard for the presumption of pro-
data that is readily available to the justices that are collected by statute for the
purpose of proportionality review. This gives a very generous estimate of
proportionality and an extremely conservative estimate of comparative
excessiveness. The larger the pool of cases used in proportionality reviews, the
smaller is the proportion of those eventually sentenced to death.
106. A confound may have been introduced into these analyses by the
1983 modifications of the language of some of the mitigating and aggravating
factors. It is unclear to what extent later death sentences were obtained under
modified statutes which would not have been obtained under the previous
versions of these statutes. See discussion supra note 13.
107. It is being considered here whether a factor was instructed, not
whether it was actually present or certified by ajury. This approach is used here
because: 1) the trial judge is only required to give instructions on aggravating
and mitigating circumstances that are supported by the evidence; 2) the trial
judge report only shows which mitigating factors were instructed, not whether
present or certified; and 3) while it does indicate which aggravating factors
were certified by the jury, in many of the life-sentenced cases reports are not
explicit about which aggravating factors were certified if any.
108. DAVID C. BALDus ET AL., EQUALJusTicE AND THE DEATH PENALTY. A
LEGAL AND EMpIaICAL ANALsis (1990). A comparison can be made between
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TABLE 3. DEATH SENTENCING RATES OF CONVICTED CAPITAL
OFFENDERS IN PUNISHMENT TRIALS BY INSTRUCTED
AGGRAVATING FACTORS
Aggravating Factors Death sentencing rate
.54 (93/173)
a. Prior murder or serious assaultive convictions .75 (36/48)
b. Multiple murder or attempt .46 (18/39)
c. Risk of death to 2 or more in public .55 (6/11)
d. Money/value motive .51 (42/83)
e. Victim/judicial officer exercising official duty .00 (0/1)
f. Murder for hire .40 (4/10)
g. Murder vile, horrible, or inhuman .50 (52/103)
h. Victim/police or fireperson .54 (7/13)
i. Defendant was an inmate or escapee .87 (20/23)
j. Kllling to avoid/stop an arrest .50 (12/24)
k. Enumerated contemporaneous felonies .54 (13/24)
1. Victim/witness or potential witness .59 (13/22)
m. Victim/correctional officer or inmate 1.00 (5/5)
n. Murder during hijacking
o. Killing to conceal specified drug offenses
p. Killing to prevent prosectuion for specified drug offense .00 (0/2)
q. Nonstatutory aggravating circumstances .63 (50/80)
portionality of .8 or higher, the only presumptively proportionate
cases involve prison killings, those cases having as aggravating
factors the killings committed by inmates or escapees or killings
in which the victim was a correctional officer or inmate. The
only other aggravating factor which comes close to the standard
of .8 involves prior murders or serious assaultive convictions.
Three-quarters of those with previous murder or serious assault-
ive convictions are sentenced to death. The death-sentencing
rates for the remainder of the categories are similar to the overall
death-sentencing rate.
None of the categories of cases are presumptively excessive,
given the present methodology; many are closer to the Baldus et
al. standard of presumptive excessiveness at .35 or less than to
the presumptive standard of proportionality. Basing a propor-
tionality review on frequency analysis rather than merely citing
precedents, the current practice of the Court in most cases,
these results for Missouri and the authors' observation that in 68 of the 69
death penalty cases the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed pursuant to its
proportionality legislation, the sentences in most, if not all, of the similar cases,
were death sentences. In almost 90% of the 68 cases analyzed:
[E]very case identified in the court's appendix as similar to the death
cases under review resulted in a death sentence. For only five of the
sixty-eight cases was the death-sentencing rate among the appendix
cases less than .75, and for only one case was it less than .50.
Id. at 203.
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would lead to very different conclusions.' °9 Based solely on
aggravating factors as a measure of similarity, the odds of being
sentenced to death for cases in most categories are a coin toss,
about one-half.11
2. Death Sentencing Frequencies-Mitigating Factors
Oftentimes the Missouri Supreme Court will state that the
presence of a mitigating factor does not preclude the death pen-
alty because similarly situated defendants have been sentenced to
death."' Again, what appears true when using the precedent-
seeking approach becomes suspect when using the frequency
approach. The data presented in Table 4 show that mitigating
factors have little to do with the death sentencing decision.1 12
109. At a minimum for these cases which fall between presumptive
proportionateness and presumptive excessiveness other circumstances should
be examined beyond the common aggravating circumstance. For example the
National Center for State Court Proportionality Review Project (Van Duizend,
supra note 14) suggests a determination be made of the appropriate purposes
of imposing capital punishment in a particular case. The U.S. Supreme Court
has indicated two purposes, retribution and deterrence. If retribution is the
desired purpose for a "class of murders" (such as those homicides that are
particularly heinous, cruel or vile), then the "regularity of imposition becomes
far less important, and the line between proportiona[teness] and excessiveness
may be set so as to exclude all but the extreme cases;" if deterrence is the goal
for a class of murders (such as murders committed by prisoners upon guards or
other prisoners) then the penalty must be imposed sufficiently often to have
some deterrent effect. Van Duizend, supra note 14, at 12.
110. While the seemingly acceptable rate for the Missouri Supreme Court
falls far short of the standard suggested by the empirical research of Baldus et
al., supra note 108, one jurist has suggested that the threshold frequency at
which a death sentence becomes appropriate should be significantly greater
than 50 percent, State v. Jeffries, 717 P.2d 722, 744 (Wash. 1986) (Utter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Utter of the Washington Supreme Court noted in dissent in
State v. Benn, 845 P.2d 289, 332 (Wash. 1993), that another jurisdiction, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, does look closely at the relative frequency of
death sentences in a given pool of similar cases and approves death sentences as
proportionate where the vast majority of defendants in similar cases also
received the death penalty. Examples of these reviews by the Pennsylvania
court include Commonwealth v. Smith, 513 A.2d 1371 (Pa. 1986) (finding
death penalty proportionate where it was imposed in eight of nine similar
cases) and Commonwealth v. Morales, 494 A.2d 367, (Pa. 1985) (finding death
penalty proportionate where it was imposed in seven of seven similar cases).
111. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
112. It is assumed for purposes of this study that an instruction on a
mitigating factor bears some resemblance to the underlying evidence presented
to the jury. Some evidence of mitigation before an instruction on mitigation is
submitted is required by the Notes on the Use of the Missouri Approved
Criminal Instructions: "(4) Any one or more of the eight subparagraphs on
statutory mitigating circumstances will be given upon request by the defendant
if there is evidence to support the specific mitigating circumstance or
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For the most part, death-sentencing rates hover around 50%,
regardless of which mitigating factors have been instructed. The
most helpful mitigating factor tends to be the lack of a significant
prior record, with a death-sentencing rate of .38 in cases where
this mitigating factor is instructed. The presence of nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances,'1 3 usually surrounding the stability of a
defendant's home life, employment history, or standing in the
community, also appears to lower the odds of being sentenced to
death. Some counterintuitive findings include slightly higher
rates of death sentencing among defendants who acted under
duress or lacked substantial mental capacity.' 1 4
circumstances requested." MAI-CR 3d § 313.44, Notes on Use (emphasis
added).
This assumption of underlying evidence may not be entirely warranted, as
judges may give suggested instructions when there is actually little supporting
evidence to avoid appellate reversal, or out of some attempt to show some
deference to the defendant. The Missouri Supreme Court has recognized this
possibility where it observed that the trial court in State v. Johns appeared to
have "prudently submitted any mitigating circumstance that had any basis,
however tenuous." State v. Johns, 679 S.W.2d 253, 268 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
It might seem that judges are exercising more care with instructions upon
aggravating circumstances in assuring there is adequate underlying evidence to
submit an aggravating circumstance to the jury for its consideration. This
caution in submitting aggravating factors is largely for the same reasons
(deference for the defendant, and a desire to avoid appellate reversal) ajudge
may be encouraged to more generously submit instructions on mitigating
factors. See, e.g., State v. Stokes, 638 S.W.2d 715 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
However, a lack of supporting evidence for a mitigating factor instruction
is probably not the norm as the data shows instances where trial judges refuse to
instruct on mitigating factors despite the claims of some supporting evidence.
See, e.g., trial court reports submitted pursuant to Mo. REv. STAT § 565.035.6
(Supp. 1986) for State v. Lashley, 667 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), and
State v. Shaw, 636 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
113. Instructions regarding specific statutory mitigating factors are
permitted. Missouri law does not allow an instruction for jurors to consider
specific nonstatutory mitigating evidence. They may be instructed in a general
manner to consider any circumstance which is found from the evidence in
mitigation of punishment. State v. Smith, 756 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc).
114. Research in other jurisdictions has found that some factors listed as
mitigative, such as mental or emotional disturbance, may be viewed as
aggravative by the sentencer because of its perceived association with
dangerousness. E.F. Berkman, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in
Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 291 (1989). There could be several
reasons for this counterintuitive result. An instruction on this factor may
dehumanize the convicted defendant in the eyes of the sentencer. See Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). A further explanation may be that although an
instruction on this factor is given, the underlying evidence is not well
presented. This may be due to inadequate investigation by the defense or lack
of expert testimony.
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TABLE 4. DEATH SENTENCING RATES OF CONVICTED CAPITAL
OFFENDERS IN PUNISHMENT TRIALS BY INSTRUCTED
MITIGATING FACTORS
Mitigating Factors Death sentencing rate
.54 (93/173)
a. Lacks significant prior record .38 (30/78)
b. Influenced by extreme mental or emotional distrubance .58 (35/60)
c. Victim precipitation or consent .50 (5/10)
d. Defendant was a only minor participant .49 (20/41)
c. Defendant acted under duress or domination of another .62 (21/34)
f. Lacked substantial capacity to appreciate/conform conduct .62 (32/52)
g. Defendant's age .48 (47/98)
h. Nonstatutory mitigating circumstances .43 (27/63)
3. Aggregated Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Rather than specific aggravating and mitigating factors,
death sentences may be related to the aggregate number of
aggravating and mitigating factors.115 This possibility is consid-
ered in Table 5. The number of aggravating factors does appear
to make a difference. In cases with only one aggravating factor
instructed, two-fifths are sentenced to death as compared to
115. As the importance or weight of just one factor may outweigh a
multitude of factors that are presented by the opposing side, it would be
incorrect to assume that the presentation of more mitigating factors than
aggravating factors will always result in a life sentence. The Missouri Supreme
Court has cautioned that consideration of the factors in the sentencing
determination is not supposed to be a "tallying" process. State v. Wilkins, 736
S.W.2d 409, 415 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
Despite this cautionary statement, the Missouri Supreme Court seems to
have been influenced by the mere number of aggravating and mitigating
factors presented in its review of death sentences. The Court has on occasion
referred to the number of factors instructed upon in assessing the strength of
one side's case. By statute the Missouri Supreme Court is required to examine
whether a sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.035.3(1) (1984).
The Court has in several cases found a lack of arbitrariness in the sentence by
referring to the multiple number of aggravating factors certified by the jury. In
State v. Schneider, 736 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. 1987) (en banc), the Court referred to
three statutory and six nonstatutory factors that were certified by the jury; in
State v. Laws, 661 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), State v. Blair 638 S.W.2d
739, 746 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), and State v. Driscoll, 711 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.
1986) (en banc), three aggravating factors were certified by the jury; and, in
State v. Foster, 700 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), four statutory factors
were certified by the jury. The Court has also contrasted the number of
aggravating factors with the number or lack of mitigating circumstances
submitted by the defendant. In State v. Amrine, 741 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1987)
(en banc), three statutory and six nonstatutory factors were compared to the
dearth of mitigating factors submitted to jury.
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about three-fifths of those with two or more."' 6 The only anom-
aly is the lower rate among cases with five or more aggravating
factors, but this finding should be considered cautiously given
the small number of cases." 7 There seems to be no pattern in
death-sentencing rates by the number of mitigating factors, other
than cases involving either two or five, which have the lowest
rates.
Due to the small number of cases in the cells of Table 5 it is
difficult to ascertain the simultaneous effects of aggravating and
mitigating factors. However, death sentences could be expected
to be most common when aggravating factors outnumber miti-
gating factors, and lower when mitigating outnumber aggravat-
ing. To test this possibility, a diagonal box is drawn in Table 5
and those cases above the box (mitigating outnumber aggravat-
ing), within the box (aggravating and mitigating equal), and
below the box (mitigating outnumber the aggravating) are com-
pared. Overall, the pattern of death sentencing does support
such a relationship. Cases above the box result in death
sentences at a rate of .47 (27/57) compared to those in the box
at .51 (19/37) and those below at .59 (47/79). However, the
variation within these categories is broad, as can be seen in Table
5. Given these data, it would be incorrect to say that in cases in
116. The likelihood that the number of aggravating factors instructed
upon may reflect the aggravative qualities of a capital case is increased by the
incentives under which the prosecution operates. The prosecutor has an
incentive to request as many instructions on aggravating factors as are
permitted to reduce the likelihood of having the sentence reversed on appeal,
particularly if an appellate court finds insufficient supporting evidence for one
of the aggravating factors found by the jury. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862
(1983), held that an appellate invalidation of one aggravating circumstance
does not require reversal if other valid aggravating factors were sufficient to
support a death sentence.
117. Despite these findings there is the likelihood that the number of
mitigating factors instructed upon could reflect the mitigative qualities of the
case. The defense also has an incentive to have instructed as many mitigating
factors as possible to allow ajury wide opportunity to give the lesser sentence. It
is assumed for purposes of this study that the number of mitigating factors
bears some resemblance to the underlying evidence presented to thejury. That
is, trial judges will not give an instruction on a mitigating factor unless there was
some submissible evidence to justify this instruction. The notes on the use of
the Missouri Approved Criminal Instructions require that there be some
evidence of mitigation before an instruction on mitigation is submitted. In the
Notes on Use of the Missouri Approved Instructions-Criminal, it is stated that:
"Any one or more of the eight subparagraphs on statutory mitigating
circumstances will be given upon request by the defendant if there is evidence to
support the specific mitigating circumstance or circumstances requested."
MAI-CR 3d § 313.44(4), Notes on Use (emphasis added).
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TABLE 5. DEATH SENTENCING RATES OF CONVICTED CAPITAL
OFFENDERS IN PUNISHMENT TRIALS BY THE NUMBER OF
INSTRUCTED AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING
FACTORS
Number of Number of Mitigating Factors
Aggravating
Factors 0 1 2 3 4 5+ Total
1 .43 .71 .10 .31 .80 .33 .40
(3/7) (5/7) (1/10) (4/13) (4/5) (1/3) (18/45)
2 .50 .69 .45 .71 .67 .60 .59
(3/6) (9/13) (9/20) 10/14) (2/3) (3/5) (36/61)
3 1.0 .60 .50 .67 .67 .00 .62
(5/5) (6/10) (6/12) (4/6) (2/3) (0/1) (23/37)
4 .50 .60 .80 .71 .25 - .61
(1/2) (3/5) (4/5) (5/7) (1/4) (14/23)
5+ 1.0 - .25 .00 - .29
(1/1) (1/4) (0/2)
Total .62 .66 .41 .55 .60 .44 .54
(13/21) (23/35) (21/51) (23/42) (9/15) (4/9) (93/173)
which the aggravating outnumber the mitigating factors death
sentences are presumptively proportionate.
V. CONCLUSION
The results of this research indicate that the Missouri
Court's methods for proportionality review are inappropriate for
the needs of the task. As has been stated 18 about the propor-
tionality review conducted by another jurisdiction:
"This is not proportionality review as mandated by the capi-
tal statute . . .but a process of legally rationalizing trial
court decisions to impose death as punishment, regardless
of proportionality or excessiveness relative to the sentences
in similar cases."
118. William J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination
under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74 J. Cim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1094
(1983).
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The Missouri Supreme Court itself has suggested that the
requirements of proportionality are not to be taken seriously.119
In State v. Jones12° the Court ruled that only "relative proportion-
ality" is required. "A death sentence does not have to be set aside
simply because the jury decreed life imprisonment in what might
seem to be a more aggravated case." 12 ' The observations of a dis-
senting Supreme Courtjudge in one Missouri case are applicable
to the Missouri proportionality review process as a whole. The
process "does not ... demonstrate that the sentence of death is
not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in simi-
lar cases."12 2 Frequently the Court will dispose of this aspect of an
appeal "with a single sentence at the close of the opinion, stating
the conclusion that the penalty imposed is not excessive or dis-
proportionate and citing, without elaboration," 123 at most a few
cases.
The Court relies upon a small sub-sample of death cases 124
and has come to rely exclusively upon death cases.' 25 Without
using a frequency approach, there is no way for the Court to indi-
cate what degree of relativity it desires for the statutory propor-
tionality requirement.
The analyses employed to test the assumptions of the Mis-
souri Supreme Court126 constitute but the roughest frequency
approach possible. Yet, if the Missouri Supreme Court were to
have completed even this simple analysis, its conclusions in many
cases would have been vastly different. Its presumption of pro-
portionality generally rests on a selective list of precedents.
Whereas, if all cases with similar aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances were consulted in a case under review, the propor-
tion of cited cases sentenced to death would average about one-
half. The only exception would probably be in the cases of
prison killings. With such figures, it would be difficult to claim
proportionality.
Significant improvements could be made in the Missouri
Supreme Court's procedures on proportionality review with little
effort. Suggestions for improvements have been made in this
119. See State v. Jones, 749 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); State v.
Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
120. State v. Jones, 749 S.W.2d 356, 366 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
121. Id. at 366.
122. State v. LaRette, 648 S.W.2d 96, 107 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (Seiler, J.,
dissenting in part).
123. Id. at 108.
124. See supra Table I.
125. See supra Table II.
126. See supra Tables III, IV and V.
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article. 12 7 Importantly, the comparison cases should be drawn
from a much larger pool from the earlier stages of the arrest,
charging or indictment. Since more life cases would be included
in the review128 such a procedure would be more effective at
identifying presumptively proportionate and presumptively
excessive cases. Such an approach would likely lead to a large
number of cases in which the imposition of the death penalty is
obviously disproportionate or at the least questionable. 129
A more effective means of testing for proportionality would
be to perform a Baldus-style analysis in which cases are grouped
by the level of seriousness. Factors including the blameworthi-
ness of the defendant and seriousness of the case could be
included.13 While such an approach is beyond the scope of the
current article, 1 3 ' even using the Missouri Supreme Court's
methods in choosing the pool of eligible cases and in selecting
comparable cases, the simple frequency analyses presented
herein do not show the vast majority of death penalty cases to be
either presumptively proportionate or excessive. Only more
extensive analyses based on the seriousness of the cases would
provide sufficient evidence of proportionality. 3 2
The Missouri Supreme Court has the "time and the means
by which to compare cases and then articulate why or what it is
127. See Bentele, supra note 33 (criticism of threshold function
interpretation of aggravating factors); Suni, supra note 65 (suggestion for
greater use of available information in sentencing review); Van Duizend, supra
note 109 (suggestions for review of cases falling between levels of presumed
proportionateness and excessiveness).
128. See discussion supra in note 105.
129. The recommendation of the National Center for State Court
Proportionality Review Project was to have the pool of cases include all cases in
which the criminal charge included a death eligible offense and homicide
conviction was obtained. See Van Duizend, supra note 14, at 11.
130. The most vociferous proponent on the Washington Supreme Court
of a more rigorous proportionality review has found that this approach using a
multiple regression analysis to calculate a culpability score may seem overly
complex and quantitative for a court not made up of statisticians. State v.
Jeffries, 717 P.2d 722, 744 (Wash. 1986) (Utter,J., dissenting); accord Blake v.
Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. Ga. 1981), State v. Williams, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355-56
(N.C. 1983).
131. The salient-features approach, described in David C. Baldus et al.,
Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33
STAN. L. Rxv. 1 (1980), may be more feasible. With this approach the reviewing
court would: "(1) identify some major aggravating and mitigating factors, (2)
pool all cases having those characteristics, and (3) compute the death penalty
frequency within that pool." State v. Jeffries, 717 P.2d 722, 744 (Wash. 1986)
(Utter, J., dissenting).
132. See discussion supra note 109.
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that causes [it] to reach the end result.""' 3 However, the Court
has not elected to use its available resources for a meaningful
proportionality review process. Proportionality review as applied
in this jurisdiction does little more than allow the reviewing court
to justify a death sentence.
This analysis indicates an enfeebled proportionality review
process. This can only exacerbate a system that is not operating
to minimize the possibility of arbitrary and capricious sentenc-
ing. Where the role of aggravating factors in sentencing does
not narrow the kinds of murders that may be subject to the death
penalty, 3 a subsequent ineffective method of proportionality
review renders a capital punishment process subject to the sen-
tencing evils condemned in Furman v. Georgia.1" 5
APPENDIX
Missouri Statutes on Aggravating and Mitigating Sentencing Factors
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(1) (1984): "The offense was commit-
ted by a person with a prior record of conviction for murder in
the first degree, or the offense was committed by a person who
has one or more serious assaultive criminal convictions[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(2) (1984): "The murder in the first
degree offense was committed while the offender was engaged
in the commission or attempted commission of another unlaw-
ful homicide [.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(3) (1984): "The offender by his act
of murder in the first degree knowingly created a great risk of
death to more than one person by means of a weapon or
device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more
than one person [.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(4) (1984): "The offender committed
the offense of murder in the first degree for himself or
another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other
thing of monetary value from the victim of the murder or
another[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(5) (1984): "The murder in the first
degree was committed against ajudicial officer, former judicial
officer, prosecuting attorney or former prosecuting attorney,
circuit attorney or former circuit attorney, assistant prosecut-
ing attorney or former assistant prosecuting attorney, assistant
circuit attorney or former assistant circuit attorney, peace
133. State v. LaRette, 648 S.W.2d 96, 111 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (SeilerJ.,
dissenting in part).
134. See discussion supra note 13.
135. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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officer or former peace officer, elected official or former
elected official during or because of the exercise of his official
duty[.]".
Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.032.2(6) (1984): "The offender caused or
directed another to commit murder in the first degree or com-
mitted murder in the first degree as an agent or employee of
another person [.]"
Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.032.2(7) (1984): "The murder in the first
degree was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind[.]"
Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.032.2(8) (1984): "The murder in the first
degree was committed against any peace officer, or fireman
while engaged in performance of his official duty[.]"
Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.032.2(9) (1984): "The murder in the first
degree was committed by a person in, or who has escaped
from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT: § 565.032.2(10) (1984): "The murder in the first
degree was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering
with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of law-
ful confinement, of himself or another[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(11) (1989): "The murder in the first
degree was committed while the defendant was engaged in the
perpetration or was aiding or encouraging another person to
perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate a felony of any degree of
rape, sodomy, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, or any felony
offense in chapter 195, RSMo[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(12) (1984): "The murdered individ-
ual was a witness or potential witness in any past or pending
investigation or past or pending prosecution, and was killed as
a result of his status as a witness or potential witness[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(13) (1984): "The murdered individ-
ual was an employee of an institution or facility of the depart-
ment of corrections and human resources of this state or local
correction agency and was killed in the course of performing
his official duties, or the murdered individual was an inmate of
such institution or facility[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(14) (1984): "The murdered individ-
ual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an airplane, train,
ship, bus or other public conveyance[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(15) (1989): "The murder was com-
mitted for the purpose of concealing or attempting to conceal
any felony offense defined in chapter 195, RSMo[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.2(16) (1989): "The murder was com-
mitted for the purpose of causing or attempting to cause a per-
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son to refrain from initiating or aiding in the prosecution of a
felony offense defined in chapter 195, RSMo."
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.1(3) (1984): "Any ... aggravating cir-
cumstances otherwise authorized by law and supported by the
evidence and requested by a party including any aspect of the
defendant's character, the record of any prior criminal convic-
tions, and pleas and findings of guilty and admissions of guilt
of any crime or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.3(1) (1984): "The defendant has no
significant history of prior criminal activity[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.3(2) (1984): "The murder in the first
degree was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.3(3) (1984): "The victim was a partici-
pant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.3(4) (1984): "The defendant was an
accomplice in the murder in the first degree committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.3(5) (1984): "The defendant acted
under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of
another person [.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.3(6) (1984): "The capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substan-
tially impaired [.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.3(7) (1984): "The age of the defend-
ant at the time of the crime[.]"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032.1(3) (1984): "Any mitigating ... cir-
cumstances otherwise authorized by law and supported by the
evidence and requested by a party including any aspect of the
defendant's character ... [.]"
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